American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse: The Problem of Defective Incorporation in Utah by Waddoups, Douglas C.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1995 | Issue 1 Article 7
3-1-1995
American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse: The
Problem of Defective Incorporation in Utah
Douglas C. Waddoups
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Douglas C. Waddoups, American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse: The Problem of Defective Incorporation in Utah, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 303
(1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1995/iss1/7
American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse: The 
Problem of Defective Incorporation in Utah 
As a general rule, individuals are personally liable for the 
liabilities that flow fkom their business dealings. The protection 
of the corporate shield, however, is an exception to  this rule. It 
protects shareholders from being personally liable for the 
liabilities of the corporation. In order to  invoke this protection 
the corporation must be formed and maintained with the 
proper formalities. When these formalities are not precisely 
adhered t o  in formation, no corporation exists, and 
consequently, there is no corporate shield for shareholders. 
In an attempt to protect shareholders who inadvertently 
fail to  comply with the formalities of incorporation, the common 
law developed the doctrines of de facto corporations and 
corporation by estoppel,' which, when applicable, protected 
shareholders and third parties dealing with defectively formed 
corporations. 
Over the years the application of the doctrines of de facto 
corporations and corporation by estoppel has become one of the 
most confusing areas of the law. In response, many states, 
including Utah, have adopted the Model Business Corporation 
Act, or similar legislation that attempts to  create a bright-line 
rule regarding corporate formation and shareholder liability. In 
the wake of this legislation, there still remains confusion about 
whether the doctrines of de facto corporations and corporation 
by estoppel are completely dead or are still applicable in 
limited circumstances. 
American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse2 is the first case 
in which Utah courts have addressed the effect of the Utah 
Business Corporation Act on these doctrines. This note 
distinguishes the facts and the holding of Morse from other 
factual situations involving these doctrines that will arise 
1. See, e.g., Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 444-45 @.C. 1964). 
2. 881 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 
1995). 
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under the Act and offers suggestions about how the doctrine 
should be applied. 
This note begins with a summary of the facts of Morse and 
the Utah Court of Appeals' reasoning. It then traces the 
background of the doctrines of de facto corporations and 
corporation by estoppel a t  common law and how these doctrines 
led to the drafting of the Model Business Corporation Act. 
Next, the note analyzes the decision of the court of appeals, 
concluding that the court correctly found that the Utah 
Business Corporation Act eliminated the doctrine of de facto 
corporations. It concludes, however, that while the court 
reached the right result with respect to corporation by estoppel, 
the  court's language eliminating the doctrine in  all 
circumstances is too broad and if followed would limit the 
court's ability to prevent injustice. Finally, this note articulates 
a test by which courts can apply the Utah Business 
Corporation Act where applicable and still use the doctrine of 
corporation by estoppel to prevent injustice. 
A. The Facts 
Douglas M. Durbano and Kevin S. Garn3 purported to 
enter into a contract on behalf of American Vending Services, 
Inc. (American Vending) with Wayne L. and Dianne L. Morse 
to buy a car wash. At the time the parties executed the con- 
tract, the articles of incorporation for American Vending had 
not been filed, although Mr. Durbano had received permission 
from the Utah Division of Corporations to use the name Ameri- 
can Vending Services, Inc. Twice prior to the execution of the 
contract, Mr. Durbano had tried to file the articles, but they 
had been returned because of name conflicts. The articles of in- 
corporation for American Vending were finally filed several 
weeks after the contract had been signed. 
Although American Vending operated the car wash for 
three years, it experienced financial troubles from the very 
start. I t  failed to make any payments to the Morses on the 
balance owing under the sales contract. American Vending 
eventually defaulted on its debt obligation to its bank, and the 
bank foreclosed on the car wash. 
- - - 
3. Ironically, both men were licensed lawyers. Morse, 881 P.2d at 918. 
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The Morses sued American Vending, as well as Mr. 
Durbano and Mr. Garn personallyO4 The trial court dismissed 
the Morses' claim against Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn, finding 
that American Vending was a de facto corporation and thus the 
individuals could not be personally liable.' The court entered 
judgment in favor of the Morses in the amount of $76,832 on 
their claim against American Vending, but they have been 
unable to  collect on the judgement because American Vending 
has no income or assets! On appeal the Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court's ruling that Mr. Durbano and Mr. 
Garn were not personally liable, holding that, following the 
passage of the Utah Business Corporation Act,' the doctrines 
of de facto corporations and corporation by estoppel were no 
longer viable in Utah. 
B. The Reasoning of the Utah Court of Appeals 
1.  De facto corporations 
Interpreting two sections of the Utah Business Corporation 
Act, sections 16-10-51 and 16-10-139; the court concluded that 
the doctrine of de facto corporations was no longer a viable 
doctrine in Utah. Section 51 provided that a corporation cannot 
exist until the certificate of incorporation is issued: 
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the cor- 
porate existence shall begin, and the certificate of incorpora- 
tion shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 919. 
7. Id. at 927. 
8. The Utah Business Corporation Ad has been repealed and replaced by 
the Revised Utah Business Corporation Act, which was adapted from the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act. The sections of the Utah Revised Ad that are rel- 
evant to the issues of de fado corporations and corporation by estoppel are $8 16- 
10a-203 to 204. Sedion 16-10a-203(1) provides in relevant part: "A corporation is 
incorporated, and its corporate existence begins, when the articles of incorporation 
are filed by the division . . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-203(1) (Supp. 1994). 
UTAH CODE ANN. $ 16-10a-204 (Supp. 1994) provides: "All persons purporting 
to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was no incorporation under 
this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created while so act- 
ing." 
Under the Revised Act, the analysis and conclusions of this note remain the 
same. See infra note 41 (discussing the impact of the Revised Ad on the doctrine 
of de fado corporations) and note 62 (discussing the impact of the Revised Ad on 
the doctrine of corporation by estoppel). 
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required of the incorporators have been complied with and the 
corporation has been incorporated under this act, except as 
against this state in a proceeding to cancel or revoke the 
certificate of incorporation or for involuntary dissolution of 
the corporation? 
The court also relied upon section 139, which provided: "All 
persons who assume to  act as a corporation without authority 
so to do shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and 
liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof."1° In inter- 
preting the meaning of these sections, the court relied on the 
comments to the Model Business Corporation Act, from which 
sections 51 and 139 were adopted. These comments expressly 
state that the provisions were "designed to prohibit the applica- 
tion of any theory of de facto incorporation."" 
Relying on the plain meaning of sections 51 and 139, as 
well as the comments to the Model Business Corporation Act, 
the court found that the trial court erred in concluding as a 
matter of law that American Vending was a de facto corpora- 
tion.12 In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished 
Vincent Drug Co. u. State Tax Commi~sion,'~ decided four 
years after the enactment of the Utah Business Corporation 
Act. In Vincent Drug the Utah Supreme Court applied the doc- 
trine of de facto corporations but did not mention the Act. The 
court reasoned that Vincent Drug was distinguishable on its 
facts and that it had been implicitly ~verruled.'~ The court 
also cited with approval cases from other jurisdictions in which 
courts had not found Vincent Drug persuasive on the issue of 
9. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-51 (1991) (repealed 1992). 
10. Id. 8 16-10-139. 
11. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 146 cmt., at 908 (1971); see also id. 
5 56 cmt., at 205 (stating that "a de facto corporation cannot exist under the Mod- 
el Act"). 
12. American Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 935 (Utah App. 
1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995). 
13. 407 P.2d 683 (Utah 1965). 
14. The court cited Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163 
(Utah 1977) (holding that the president of a nonexistent corporation was personal- 
ly liable for the debt of the corporation), and Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 
(10th Cir. 1982) (holding that a president and secretary of a corporation who 
signed debentures for the corporation two days before the corporation came into 
existence were personally liable), as support that Vincent Drug had been implicitly 
overruled. See also Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v. Music City Lumber Co., 683 
S.W.2d 340, 344 (T~M. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that Vincent Drug is unpersuasive 
for the proposition that a de facto corporation can exist under the Model Business 
Corporations Act). 
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whether a de facto corporation could exist under the Model 
Business Corporation Act. l5 
2. Corporation by estoppel 
The Utah Court of Appeals was unanimous in its decision 
that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel did not apply to the 
facts in Morse. The court was not unanimous, however, on 
whether the Utah Business Corporation Act precluded applying 
the doctrine of corporation by estoppel in every circum- 
stance? The majority stated that the language of sections 51 
and 139 prohibits the application of the doctrine of corporation 
by estoppel in every situation, while the minority would allow 
the doctrine to be applied in limited circumstance where "both 
parties reasonably believed they are dealing with a corporation 
and neither party has actual or constructive knowledge that 
the corporation does not exist."" The court's statements con- 
cerning the applicability of the doctrine of corporation by estop- 
pel to facts different than those presented in Morse, however, 
should be viewed as dicta since the facts in that case did not 
encompass every situation in which the doctrine could be ap- 
plied. 
A. De Facto Corporations at  Common Law 
At common law, corporations could be either de jure or de 
facto.18 A de jure corporation is one that has been created as 
the result of compliance with all of the constitutional or statu- 
tory requirements of a government entity.lg At common law, 
15. Morse, 881 P.2d at 922 n.10 (citing Timberland Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 
514 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Or. 1973) and Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v. Music City 
Lumber Co., 683 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tern. Ct. App. 1984)). 
16. The concurring opinion contains the view of the majority on the corpo- 
ration by estoppel issue. Morse, 881 P.2d a t  927-29 (Garff, J., concurring). 
17. Morse, 881 P.2d at 925. 
18. See, e.g., Harris v. Stephens Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 309 So. 2d 115, 
117-18 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975); Wayne N. Bradley, Comment, An Empirical Study of 
Defective Incorporation, 39 EMORY L.J. 523, 524-30 (1990) (discussing the back- 
ground and development of de facto corporations); Christopher P. Yates, Note, Rli- 
nois Corporate Investors' Liability in the Case of Defective Incorporation, 1986 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1255, 1258-61 (discussing the development and application of the doc- 
trine of de fado corporations); Fritz B. Ziegler, Comment, De Fwto Incorporation 
and Estoppel to Deny Corporate Existence in Louisiana, 37 LA. L. REV. 1121, 1121- 
. 23 (1977) (discussing the traditional common law rules of de fado corporations). 
19. Harris, 309 So. 2d at  117. 
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the doctrine of de facto corporations was created to protect indi- 
viduals from personal liability when they were conducting 
business before the corporate formalities were complete.20 A 
de facto corporation could be brought into being when it could 
be shown that 1) the state had a statute which authorized 
incorporation, 2) a colorable attempt had been made to incorpo- 
rate under the statute, and 3) actual corporate action had been 
takenz1 In addition, the incorporators were, in some jurisdic- 
tions, required to have acted in good faith in claiming to be a 
corporationF2 When these elements were met, a de facto cor- 
poration was created that, for all intents and purposes, had the 
same rights and privileges as a de jure co rp~ra t ion .~~  
B. Corporation by Estoppel at Common Law 
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel was applied when 
the elements of a de facto corporation could not be met, yet 
equity demanded that, because of their actions, parties be 
barred from denying the existence of the corporationF4 As the 
doctrine developed, corporation by estoppel became one of the 
most confusing areas of corporate law, and many courts had 
trouble defining and applying the doctrine.25 Many courts 
have failed to recognize that the term "corporation by estoppel" 
is a misnomer." Unlike a de facto corporation, no corporation 
is deemed to exist?' Further, there is no estoppel in the gen- 
eral sense because in many situations there is no reliance? 
20. American Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 920-21 (Utah App. 
1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995). 
21. See, e.g., Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 @.C. 1964); 8 WILLLAM . 
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 5 3761 
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1992); see also Harris, 309 So. 2d at  117. 
22. See, e.g., Robertson, 197 A.2d a t  445. 
23. See id. The only situation where a de facto corporation does not have all 
of the rights of a de jure corporation is in a quo warranto proceeding brought by 
the state against the corporation. See id. 
24. See Bradley, supra note 18, a t  524-27, 529-30 (discussing the background 
and development of corporations by estoppel); Yates, supra note 18, at  1258-61 
(discussing the development and application of the doctrine of corporation by estop- 
pel); Ziegler, supra note 18, at  1123-25 (discussing the traditional common law rule 
of corporation by estoppel). 
25. Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 514 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Or. 1973). 
26. See Willis v. City of Valdez, 546 P.2d 570, 574 (Alaska 1976); Robertson, 
197 A.2d a t  445; Ziegler, supra note 18, a t  1123 ("A 'corporation by estoppel' is not 
really a corporation."). 
27. See, e.g., Childs v. Philpot, 487 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Ark. 1972); Robertson, 
197 A.2d a t  445. 
28. See Robertson, 197 A.2d a t  445. 
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Instead, the doctrine of corporation by estoppel is applied when 
the court finds that, because of the agreements or conduct29 of 
the parties, it would be inequitable to allow the parties to  deny 
the existence of the ~orporation.~~ Thus, the entity could not 
conduct business as a legal entity, nor could it continue con- 
ducting business once the defective incorporation became 
known. 
C. The Model Business Corporation Act 
In response to widespread criticism of the confusing and 
arbitrary state of the law of defective incorp~ration,~' the 
drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act attempted t o  
clarify when corporate existence begins. Two sections of the 
Model Act, sections 56 and 146, have substantially changed the 
way the courts have applied the common law corporation doc- 
t r i n e ~ . ~ ~  
First, section 56 provides that corporate existence cannot 
begin until the certificate of incorporation is issued. Section 56 
provides: 
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the cor- 
porate existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorpora- 
tion shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent 
required to be performed by the incorporators have been com- 
plied with and that the corporation has been incorporated 
under this Act, except as against this State in a proceeding to 
cancel or revoke the certificate of incorporation or for involun- 
tary dissolution of the corp~rat ion.~~ 
29. Typical conduct that may result in the application of corporation by estop- 
pel is signing a contract with an entity acknowledging it as a corporation before it 
has been incorporated. See, e.g., Arbo Corp. v. Aidan MktgJDistribution, Inc., 639 
F. Supp. 1512 (D. Minn. 1986); Southern-Gulf Marine Co. No. 9 v. Camcraft, Inc., 
410 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 412 So. 2d 1115 (La. 1982). 
30. See, e.g., Harris v. Stephens Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 309 So. 2d 115, 
118 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975); Willis, 546 P.2d at  574; Childs, 487 S.W.2d at 641; Rob- 
ertson, 197 A.2d a t  445-46; Harry Rich Corp. v. Feinberg, 518 So. 2d 377, 379 @la. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
31. See Robertson, 197 A.2d a t  445 n.6 (citing commentators and other au- 
thorities critical of the doctrine of de facto corporations); Ziegler, supra note 18, a t  
1137-38 (describing this area of the law as "in a hopeless state of confusion" and 
then describing the effect of the Model Business Corporation Act). 
32. See Bradley, supra note 18, at 532-36 (discussing the history and the im- 
pact of the Model Act); Yates, supra note 18, a t  1261-64 (discussing the reasons for 
and the drafting of the Model Act). 
33. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 56. Section 56 is enacted nearly ver- 
batim at UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10-51 (repealed 1992). See supra note 9. 
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The comments to  this section eliminate any ambiguity about 
the drafters' intent. They state that Tulnder the unequivocal 
provisions of the Model Ad,  any steps short of securing a certif- 
icate of incorporation would not constitute apparent compli- 
ance. Therefore a de facto corporation cannot exist under the 
Model 
Second, section 146 indirectly addresses the issue of defeo 
tive incorporation by providing that individuals who act on 
behalf of a non-existent corporation are not protected by the 
corporate shield and therefore may be personally liable.35 Sec- 
tion 146 provides: "All persons who assume to act as a corpora- 
tion without authority so to do shall be jointly and severally 
liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a result 
thereof."36 As with section 56, the comments reflect the 
drafters' attempt t o  avoid ambiguity about the effect of section 
146 on the doctrine of de facto corporation: "This section is de- 
signed to prohibit the application of any theory of de facto in- 
~orporation."~' In 1961 the Utah Legislature adopted the Mod- 
el Business Corporation Act, including sections 56" and 
146;' without substantial modifi~ation.'~ 
A. De Facto Corporations 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly found that a de facto 
corporation cannot exist under the Utah Business Corporation 
Act:' In its common law application, the doctrine of de facto 
34. MODEL BUSINESS COW. ACT ANN. 5 56 at . ,  at  205. 
35. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corpora- 
tion, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 121-22 (1991) (stating that $ 146 led t o  results that were 
surprising in the context of the parties' intentions). 
36. MODEL BUSINESS COW. ACT ANN. 5 146. 
37. Id. 5 146 cmt., at 908. 
38. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 16-10-51 (repealed 1992). See supra note 9 and ac- 
companying text for the text of this section. 
39. Id. $ 16-10-139. 
40. Id. $5 16-10-1 to 141. 
41. American Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 922 (Utah App. 
1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995). 
Under the Revised Utah Business Corporation Act de facto corporations are 
also impossible. The beginning point for corporate existence, however, is different. 
Under the Utah Business Corporation Act, corporate existence begins when the 
certificate of incorporation is issued. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 10-16-51 (repealed 1992). 
Under the Revised Act, however, the "corporate existence begins, when the articles 
of incorporation are filed by the division." Id. $ 16-10a-203(1). 
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corporations actually creates a corporation that is entitled to  all 
of the benefits and rights of a de jure c~rporation.'~ Under the 
Utah Business Corporation Act, a corporation does not, and 
cannot, exist until the issuance of the certificate of incorpora- 
t iod3 As the comments to the Model Business Corporation 
Act point out, this provision makes the creation of a de facto 
corporation imp~ssible.~~ This conclusion has been reached by 
the majority of courts which have addressed the issue.45 
The elimination of de facto corporations is sound public 
policy. This area of the law had become too confusing and un- 
predictable; therefore, to stabilize business transactions, it was 
necessary t o  develop a clear rule defining when corporate exis- 
tence begins.46 Further, because the corporate shield is provid- 
ed at the sufferance of the state, it should only offer protection 
to those who have technically availed themselves of this privi- 
lege by fulfilling the state's requirements for incorporating. 
Historically, the allowance of a de facto corporation was 
thought to  be fair because it protected incorporators who, al- 
though they had not incorporated correctly, expected to have 
the protection of a corporation." This policy of protecting indi- 
viduals, however, should be balanced with the policy that indi- 
viduals should be responsible for their own actions and commit- 
42. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. 1964); FLETCHER, supra 
note 21; Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1123. 
43. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 5 56. 
44. Id. 5 56 cmt., at 205. 
45. See, e.g., Bowers Bldg. Co. v. Altura Glass Co., 694 P.2d 876, 878 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1984); Robertson, 197 A.2d at 446; Don Swam Sales Corp. v. Echols, 287 
S.E.2d 577, 578 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 514 P.2d 
1109, 1110-11 (Or. 1973); Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v. Music City Lumber Co., 
683 S.W.2d 340, 344 (T~M. Ct. App. 1984); see also FLETCHER, supra note 21, 
5 3762.10 (discussing the impact of the Model Business Corporation Ad on the 
common law); Alexander H. Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 
U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1178 (1952) (arguing, before the Model Business Corporation 
Act was adopted, that the doctrine of de facto corporation should be eliminated); 
Mark E. Noennig, Note, The De Facto Corporation Doctrine in Montana, 39 MONT. 
L. REV. 305, 308-310 (1978) (discussing how the Model Business Corporation A d s  
elimination of de facto corporations solves some of the problems created by the 
common law "nullity" approach); Yates, szlpra note 18, at  1261 (discussing the im- 
pact of the Model Act on the doctrine of de fado corporations); Ziegler, supra note 
18, at  1137-38. 
46. See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 18, at  1137 (stating that this area of the law 
was "in a hopeless state of confusionw). 
47. American Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 920-21 (Utah App. 
1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995); Ziegler, supm note 18, at  
1121 (stating that de fado corporations developed to meet the demands of equity 
and to protect those who had aded in good faith). 
3 12 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
ments. In  balancing these two policies, the protection of the 
corporate shield should be provided only to those who have 
properly met the state's requirements of incorporation. Under 
the Utah Business Corporation Act, the requirements are 
straightforward and easy to satisfy. Negligent or ignorant indi- 
viduals should not be shielded from the effects of their actions 
or bargains if they have not acted with sufficient care to meet 
the requirements of the statute? The Utah Business Corpo- 
ration Act balances both of these interests and establishes a 
bright-line rule that makes it easy for even the least sophisti- 
cated individuals to know when they, or those they are dealing 
with, are protected by the corporate shield. 
B. Corporation by Estoppel 
Although the Utah Court of Appeals reached the correct 
result on the facts of Morse, its conclusion that the doctrine of 
corporation by estoppel is totally eliminated by the Utah Busi- 
ness Corporation Act is not well reasoned and is bad p~licy."~ 
As is explained in the following sections, the court's analysis 
was too broad because the Act does not require the court's 
conc l~s ion .~~  Instead, the court should have recognized that, 
although the doctrine is not applicable in all of the factual sce- 
narios where it was applicable under the common law, circurn- 
stances exist under which it may still be applied to prevent 
injustice. 
48. Under the Revised Utah Business Corporation Act, there is no possibility 
that the corporation will not be properly formed as a consequence of a mistake 
made by the state. Under the Revised Act, the corporate existence begins when the 
articles of incorporation are "filed." UTAH CODE ANN. $ 16-10a-203(1). This is an 
improvement from the Utah Business Corporation Act, which provided that the 
corporate existence began when the certificate of incorporation was issued by the 
state, which increased the possibility that the corporation would not come into ex- 
istence because of a mistake on the part of the state. Id. $ 16-10-51. 
49. See inha notes 71 and 76 and accompanying text. 
50. See, e.g., Arbo Corp. v. Aidan MktgJDistribution, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1512, 
1514 (D. Minn. 1986) (holding that while the Model Business Corporation Act does 
eliminate de fado corporations, it does not necessarily affect the viability of an 
estoppel defense); see also William L. Stocks, Note, Corporations-De Fmto Corpo- 
rations-EstoppeLModel Business Act, 43 N.C. L. REV. 206, 210 (1964) (arguing 
that the Model Business Corporation Act does not require the elimination of corpo- 
ration by estoppel); Yates, supra note 18, at 1263-64 (stating that under the Model 
Act the status of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel is unclear). 
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1.  Corporation by estoppel and de facto corporations are sepa- 
rate and distinct doctrines 
The first important distinction the court of appeals failed 
to make is that the doctrines of de facto corporations and corpo- 
ration by estoppel are separate and distinct.51 The doctrine of 
de facto corporations has the effect of actually creating a legal 
entity, while corporation by estoppel simply bars a limited 
number of persons from denying the corporate existence in 
resolving a specific dispute. Corporation by estoppel is an equi- 
table principle which estops parties from denying the existence 
of a corporation, for the purpose of one l a ~ s u i t ~ ~  where the 
parties have dealt with the association as a corporation or have 
acknowledged the association as a corporation. 
Historically, many courts have failed to recognize the dif- 
ference between the two doctrines.53 Even courts which have 
addressed the viability of these doctrines under the Model Act 
have failed to recognize them as distinct doctrines.54 This con- 
fusion has sometimes led the courts to treat the two doctrines 
as if they serve the same purpose and thus both could be elimi- 
nated by the same logic. The better-reasoned view, however, is 
that these doctrines serve separate and distinct purposes, and 
therefore, the elimination of de facto corporations by the Model 
Business Corporation Act does not necessarily eliminate the 
doctrine of corporation by estoppel.55 
51. See, e.g., Arbo Corp., 639 F. Supp. at 1514; Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 
443, 445 0.C. 1964) (discussing the separate functions of the two doctrines); 
Ziegler, supra note 18, at  1124-25 (discussing the overlap between the doctrines of 
de facto corporations and corporation by estoppel but recognizing the majority rule 
that the two doctrines are separate). 
52. See Childs v. Philpot, 487 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Ark. 1972); Ziegler, supra 
note 18, at 1124 (discussing the Limitations on the doctrine of corporation by estop- 
pel). 
53. See, e.g., James v. Unknown Trustees, 220 P.2d 831, 835 (Okla. 1950) 
(stating that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel may not be invoked unless the 
corporation has at least a de fado existence). 
54. See Robertson, 197 A.2d at  447 (stating that the doctrines of de facto 
corporations and corporation by estoppel are independent, but holding that the 
Model Act leads to the elimination of both doctrines by creating a bright-line rule 
concerning the beginning of corporate existence); Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v. 
Music City Lumber Co., 683 S.W.2d 340, 345 (T~M. Ct. App. 1984) (following 
Robertson and holding that the Model Business Corporation Act eliminated both de 
fado corporations and the doctrine of corporation by estoppel). 
55. See Arbo Corp. v. Aidan MktgJDistribution, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1512, 1514 
(D. Minn. 1986) (holding that the elimination of de fado corporations does not nec- 
essarily eliminate the doctrine of corporation by estoppel); Willis v. City of Valdez, 
546 P.2d 570, 574 (Alaska 1976) (holding that because doctrine of corporation by 
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The separate purposes served by these two doctrines were 
indirectly recognized by the drafters of the Model Business 
Corporation Act. The drafters commented in two places56 that 
their intention was to eliminate the doctrine of de facto corpo- 
rations, but they did not ever mention its companion doc- 
trine-corporation by estoppel. This omission is significant 
because it must be assumed that the drafters intentionally 
excluded it from the comments, and therefore did not intend for 
the Model Act to eliminate corporation by estoppel. Many 
courts have, with little explanation of their reasoning, conclud- 
ed that the Act eliminated corporation by estoppel as well as de 
facto  corporation^.^' Other courts, however, have recognized 
the separate nature and purpose of the two doctrines, and have 
therefore held that it is possible for the principle of corporation 
by estoppel to  continue t o  exist although de facto corporations 
are eliminated." In Morse, Judge Greenwood found the argu- 
ment that corporation by estoppel could continue to exist under 
the Model Business Corporation Act more persuasive. In her 
concurring opinion she argued that there was no basis in the 
comments to the Model Business Corporation Act to  support 
the position that the Model Act eliminated corporation by es- 
t ~ p p e l . ~ ~  Recognizing the different purposes served by corpora- 
tion by estoppel, she argued that the doctrine should still be 
applicable in limited circ~mstances.~~ While her suggested 
estoppel is concerned with the ads  of the parties, and doctrine of de facto corpora- 
tions is concerned with the legality of the corporation, corporation by estoppel is an 
independent doctrine and is applicable where a de facto corporation cannot be 
established). 
56. See supra notes 34 and 37. 
57. See Booker Custom Packing Co. v. Sallomi, 716 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1986) (holding that an argument similar to corporation by estoppel is preclud- 
ed by the Model Business Corporation Act without directly addressing the issue of 
corporation by estoppel under the Act); Robertson, 197 A.2d at 447; Thompson & 
Green Mach. Co., 683 S.W.2d a t  345. 
58. See Arbo Corp., 639 F. Supp. at  1514 (holding that although the Model 
Business Corporation Act eliminated de facto corporations it does not eliminate the 
estoppel defense); Stocks, supra note 50, at  210 (criticizing Robertson for holding 
that the Model Business Corporation Act eliminated corporation by estoppel and 
arguing that the elimination of corporation by estoppel would result in injustice). 
59. American Vending Sews., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah App. 
1994) (Greenwood, J., concurring), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995). 
60. The majority criticizes Judge Greenwood's analysis because she relied 
upon Harry Rich Corp. v. Feinberg, 518 So. 2d 377 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1987), in 
which corporation by estoppel was recognized by statute. The majority fails to 
recognize that the Florida statute at issue in that case simply recognized the dis- 
tinction that exists at  common law. Just because the distinction was recognized by 
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exceptions may have been too limited, it is significant that she 
recognized that the Utah Business Corporation Act did not 
eliminate the doctrine altogether. 
The language of the Utah Business Corporation Act deal- 
ing with when corporate existence begins simply is not applica- 
ble to the doctrine of corporation by estoppel. The doctrine of 
corporation by estoppel does not purport to  actually create a 
corporation; no corporation comes into existence under the 
doctrine. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' reasoning that the 
Act's language must eliminate the doctrine is erroneous. 
2. Factual scenarios where corporation by estoppel should not 
be precluded by the Utah Business Corporation Act 
Since the Utah Business Corporation Act does not express- 
ly eliminate the doctrine of corporation by estoppel, the court 
should have asked whether any provisions of the Act limit the 
doctrine's application. Section 139, which holds individuals 
liable for acts taken on behalf of a defectively formed corpora- 
tion:' limits the application of the doctrine in some-but not 
all-factual scenarios. There are scenarios where corporation 
by estoppel could be applied and would not be inconsistent 
with, or precluded by, section 1 3 9 . ~ ~  Whether corporation by 
statute in one state does not prevent the Utah courts from continuing to recognize 
the common law distinction in the absence of a statute, especially when there is 
nothing in the language of the Utah Act that would mandate that the doctrine be 
rejected. Indeed, the Arbo Corp. court, aided by the reporters' notes to the statute, 
recognized this very distinction where there was no language in the state statute 
recognizing the doctrine. Arbo Corp., 639 F. Supp. at 1514. Regardless of the 
source of the idea, the Utah courts should continue to recognize the separate pur- 
pose of corporation by estoppel. 
61. Section 51, which addresses when the corporation's existence begins, 
should not enter into the analysis of whether corporation by estoppel may apply, 
because corporation by estoppel does not rely on the fiction that a corporation has 
been created, but rather relies on equity, which requires that a party be estopped 
from denying the existence of the corporation in a particular situation. 
62. Under the Revised Utah Business Corporation Act ("Revised Ad"), which 
replaces the Utah Business Corporation Act ("Act"), the same procedure should be 
followed with nearly the same results. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel 
should remain applicable unless its application is precluded by the Revised Act. 
Under the Revised Act, corporation by estoppel will be applicable in more situa- 
tions than it is under the Act. Under the Act, 8 139 precludes the application of 
corporation by estoppel whenever its application would protect individuals who 
have acted on behalf of a nonexistent corporation. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10-139 
(repealed 1992). The Revised Act, however, adds a knowledge requirement to this 
provision and therefore would only preclude the application of corporation by estop- 
pel when its application would protect individuals who have knowingly acted on 
estoppel applies, therefore, must be determined on a case by 
case basis. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel was devel- 
oped as a tool with which the court could combat injustice, and 
the doctrine's complete elimination will result in great injus- 
t i ~ e . ~ ~  
This analysis, however, is not as difficult as it may a t  first 
seem. According to one court, there are only five factual sce- 
narios where corporation by estoppel could be appliedeB4 A re- 
view of these five scenarios demonstrates how the doctrine of 
corporation by estoppel should be applied as a tool to prevent 
injustice. 
a.  Scenario 1. A defectively formed corporation sues 
a third party and the third party is estopped from denying that 
the plaintiff is a corp~ra t ion .~~ An example of this scenario is 
Southern-Gulf Marine Co. No. 9 u. Camcraft, I ~ n c . ~ ~  In South- 
ern-Gulf, a shipbuilder contracted with an entity to build a ves- 
sel for a fixed price. The entity purported to be a corporation 
but in fact was not yet incorporated. Between the signing of the 
contract and the completion of the vessel, the vessel appreciat- 
ed in price and consequently the shipbuilder refused to deliver 
the vessel to the corporation. The corporation's suit against the 
shipbuilder was dismissed by the trial court, which found that 
there was no valid contract and thus no valid cause of action, 
based on the corporation's lack of existence when the contract 
was executed. On appeal, the court reversed and found that 
because the shipbuilder contracted with the entity as a corpora- 
tion, the shipbuilder was estopped from denying the entity's 
corporate existence. 
b. Scenario 2. A third party sues a defectively 
formed corporation and the defectively formed corporation is 
behalf of a non-existent corporation. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 16-10a-204 (emphasis add- 
ed); see REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. $ 204 cmt., at 2-47; Harry 
Rich Corp. v. Feinberg, 518 So. 2d 377, 381 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (discuss- 
ing the impact of the Revised Act on the doctrine of corporation by estoppel). 
63. See Stocks, supra note 50, at 210; Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1145 (argu- 
ing that the courts need corporation by estoppel to moderate the rigid approach of 
the Model Act). 
64. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. 1964). 
65. See FLETCHER, supra note 21, $ 3910 (discussing cases and corporation by 
estoppel under this factual scenario). 
66. 410 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 412 So. 2d 1115 (La. 
1982). This case did not arise under the Model Business Corporation Act, but the 
fads of this case illustrate one factual situation where serious injustice will result 
if corporation by estoppel is eliminated. 
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estopped from denying that it is a corp~ration.~~ An example 
of this scenario is United States v. Theod~re .~~ In this case a 
defectively formed corporation moved to  dismiss an action 
against it by the Internal Revenue Service for failure to  pro- 
duce its corporate records used in the preparation of a tax 
return. The corporation argued that it could not be sued in its 
corporate capacity because it had never filed articles of incorpo- 
ration as required by state statute. Further, the corporation 
argued that South Carolina had adopted the Model Business 
Corporation Act, which set the filing of the articles of incorpo- 
ration as the beginning of corporate existence. The court found 
that the corporation had held itself out as a corporation to  the 
public, to the government of South Carolina, and to the govern- 
ment of the United States and was therefore estopped from 
denying its corporate existence. 
c. Scenario 3. A third party sues the defective corpo- 
ration, and the incorporators who held the entity out as a cor- 
poration are estopped from denying the existence of the corpo- 
ratiod9 An example of this scenario is Peterson v. ~ a l o u n . ~ ~  
In this case Mr. Peterson was enticed t o  invest in a mortgage 
company by his accountant, who was acting on behalf of the 
unincorporated entity that sold Mr. Peterson the investment. 
Mr. Peterson later sued the corporation for alleged violations of 
the securities laws. The corporation moved to  have the suit dis- 
missed, claiming that since it was not incorporated at the time 
it entered into the contract to  sell the securities, it could not 
have been a party to the contract. The court found that because 
the accountant had purported to act on behalf of the corpora- 
tion, the corporation could not deny its existence. 
Under each of these first three scenarios, section 139 does 
not apply because the corporation is the party rather than the 
putative shareholders. If relief is to be provided under these 
scenarios, it must be provided by applying corporation by estop- 
pel. Under these scenarios, applying corporation by estoppel is 
good public policy. The doctrine prevents the corporation or 
persons it contracts with from escaping liability or avoiding 
67. See FLETCHER, supra note 21, 8 3930 (discussing cases and corporation by 
estoppel in this factual scenario). 
68. 347 F. Supp. 1070 (D.S.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 749, 
755 (4th Cir. 1973). 
69. See FLETCHER, supm note 21, § 3938 (discussing cases and corporation by 
estoppel under this factual scenario). 
70. 715 F. Supp. 212 m.D. Ill. 1989). 
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obligations based solely on the corporation's negligence in com- 
plying with the corporate f~ rma l i t i e s .~~  Allowing parties to 
escape liability simply because they failed to follow the state's 
incorporation statutes provides an  incentive not to complete the 
technical requirements of incorporation where being unincorpo- 
rated works to a party's advantage in committing some mis- 
chief or fraud. 
d. Scenario 4. Either a third party or the defective 
corporation is estopped from denying the existence of the corpo- 
ration because of prior pleadings that the parties have made in 
the laws~i t . '~  An example of this scenario is Spurlock u. San- 
ta Fe Pacific Railr~ad,'~ in which Spurlock, the owner of the 
surface estate, sued a railroad that owned the mineral estate, 
for conversion. Spurlock argued several theories, including that 
under the terms of the contract certain mineral rights were not 
severed from the surface estate, and that because of the 
railroad's failure regarding corporate f ~ r m a l i t i e s , ~ ~  the rail- 
road was not a corporation, and therefore, could not own the 
mineral rights. The court found that Spurlock was estopped 
from denying the existence of the railroad as a corporation 
because Spurlock had pled that it was a corporation and, there- 
fore, Spurlock had elected to treat the railroad as a corpora- 
tionV5 
Under this scenario, section 139 may preclude the applica- 
tion of corporation by estoppel, but only if the case involves a 
person who has acted on behalf of a defectively formed corpora- 
tion. If section 139 is not applicable, however, the application of 
corporation by estoppel is sound public policy. It prevents par- 
ties who know of the corporate defects and nevertheless assert 
the validity of the corporation from later denying the corporate 
existence when i t  becomes convenient to do so. The application 
of this rule should be flexible, however, to allow parties to 
71. See Stocks, supm note 50, at  210 (stating that the complete elimination 
of corporation by estoppel will result in injustice and illustrating the point with 
fads similar to  scenario two); Ziegler, supra note 18, at  1149-52 (discussing, in dif- 
ferent terms, the same three factual scenarios and reaching the conclusion that 
corporation by estoppel should be applied). 
72. See FLETCHER, supm note 21, 88 3944-3952 (discussing cases and corpora- 
tion by estoppel under this factual scenario). 
73. 694 P.2d 299 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985). 
74. SpurloclZs theory was that the railroad had de facto dissolved. While this 
is slightly different from the defectively formed situations, the application of corpo- 
ration by estoppel would work the same. 
75. Spurlock, 694 P.2d a t  314. 
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amend their complaints or abandon their suits without being 
estopped if they were unaware the corporation's defects? 
This result provides an incentive for parties to  take well- 
thought-out positions and encourages efficiency in the resolu- 
tion of legal disputes. 
e. Scenario 5. A third party sues the individuals 
behind the defective corporation but is estopped from denying 
the existence of the corporation. The Morse case is a classic 
example of this scenario. In an attempt t o  escape liability, the 
individuals behind American Vending Services Inc. wanted to 
estop the Morses from denying the existence of the corporation. 
Under these circumstances, section 139 provides that the indi- 
viduals behind the entity are personally liable for acting on 
behalf of a non-existent corporation. Because section 139 is 
operable in this situation, it precludes the application of corpo- 
ration by estoppel. This result is proper because if corporations 
by estoppel were applied, the doctrine would enable individuals 
to escape liability simply by their own negligence or bad 
faith?' This outcome is consistent with the common law prin- 
ciple that corporation by estoppel should be applied to protect 
those who have acted in good faith, but should never be applied 
when it would be inequitableT8 or would benefit a party who 
has acted negligently or in bad faith. 
By starting with the presumption that the doctrine of cor- 
poration by estoppel is applicable and then determining wheth- 
er its application is disabled by section 139, a court can consis- 
tently reach just results. Such an approach would yield better 
results than if the court were to blindly use corporation by 
estoppel in every situation where it could apply. Such an ap- 
proach would also yield better results than if the court were t o  
blindly eliminate the doctrine to  the detriment of those who 
have relied in good faith on the existence of the corporation and 
who therefore cannot receive justice because the corporation 
does not exist. 
76. See W H E R ,  supm note 21, $8 3944-3952. 
77. Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1146 (arguing that while the courts should ap- 
ply corporation by estoppel in some situations, it should not be applied in this 
factual scenario). 
78. See Childs v. Philpot, 487 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Ark. 1972); Ziegler, supra 
note 18, at 1124. 
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De facto corporations and corporation by estoppel devel- 
oped under the common law as a way for the courts to prevent 
harsh results when parties innocently failed to comply with the 
requirements of corporate formation. Over time this area of the 
law became inconsistent and unpredictable. In an attempt to 
create a bright-line rule regarding the beginning of corporate 
existence, the drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act 
eliminated the doctrine of de facto corporations. Questions have 
remained, however, regarding the effect of the Model Act on 
the doctrine of corporation by estoppel. 
Morse is the first case in which the Utah courts have ad- 
dressed the impact of the Model Act on de facto corporations 
and corporation by estoppel. The Utah Court of Appeals cor- 
rectly found that the Utah Business Corporations Act eliminat- 
ed the possibility of de facto corporations. With respect to the 
doctrine of corporation by estoppel, the court also reached the 
correct result on the facts of Morse; however, the broad lan- 
guage of the court precluding the doctrine of corporation by 
estoppel in all circumstances under the Act goes too far and is 
not required by the Act. If followed, this conclusion would sig- 
nificantly tie the courts' hands in  preventing injustice. 
Instead, courts should approach corporation by estoppel 
questions with the presumption that the doctrine applies un- 
less precluded by the Act. Section 139 does preclude the appli- 
cation of corporation by estoppel in some circumstances. In 
other circumstances, it is good public policy to apply corpora- 
tion by estoppel to prevent parties from benefitting from their 
negligence or bad faith in complying with the formalities of 
incorporation. 
Douglas C. Waddoups 
